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NOTES
SERIES E BONDS" - OWNERSHIP - TRANSFERABILITY AND
CREDITORS' RIGHTS - TAXATION. - The federal government,
through the agency of the Treasury Department, is pursuing a
fundamental fiscal and social policy by the continuing sale to the
public of savings bonds, particularly Series E. The government
has two primary aims: (1) to check inflation and (2) to spread
ownership of the national debt among as many members of the
public as possible. 2 The effectuation of that policy has been hin-
dered in part by discordant conclusions as to the precise nature of
the legal interests created in the bonds and in part by judicial
nullification of the treasury regulations governing them, both of
which have impaired the attractiveness of the bonds by subjecting
them to increasing litigation. It is the purpose of this note to
1. Although the following discussion proceeds in terms of Series E
bonds, it is, of course, applicable to all series of savings bonds to the extent
that they are governed by the same regulations.
2. Speaking of Bonds, United States Savings Bonds Division, Treasury
Department (June, 1946), 2.
discuss briefly the various problems which arise concerning owner-
ship, transferability and creditors' rights, and taxation.
I. OWNERSHIP
United States savings bonds are issued under the authority of
Section 22 of the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended.3 Pursuant
to the provision therein that "The various issues and series...
shall be issued in such manner and subject to such terms and con-
ditions ... as the Secretary of the Treasury may from time to time
prescribe," the Treasury Department has issued regulations 4 re-
ferred to in the bonds and forming a part thereof. Savings bonds
are issued only in registered form, and the form of registration is
considered to be conclusive of the ownership and interests there-
in,6 except as otherwise specifically provided by the regulations."
A purchaser of Series E bonds may register them in the name of a
sole owner, two coowners, or an owner and a beneficiary.7 Pay-
ment to the owner upon his separate request terminates any in-
terest of the coowner or the beneficiary in the bond." If the owner
dies prior to presentation and surrender of the bond for payment
or authorized reissue, sole and absolute ownership of the bond
vests in the other named survivor.9
3. 40 Stat. 288, § 22 (1917), as amended, 31 U. S. C. § 757c (Supp.
1946).
4. Treas. Dept. Cir. No. 530, 6th Revision, Feb. 13, 1945, 31 Code Fed.
Regs., Part 315 (Supp. 1945). Numbering of the sections has varied from year
to year and from regulation to regulation. To avoid confusion in the discus-
sion of cases the writer has converted all section numbers to correspond with
those of the regulations now in effect.
5. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 315.2 (Supp. 1945).
6. The only qualification of § 315.2 appears in § 315.13 in which it is
provided that conflicting claims as to ownership will be recognized when
established by valid judicial proceedings. But see infra note 8 and text to
note 69.
7. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 315.4(a) (Supp. 1945). The Series E bond
may be registered only in the names of natural persons, adults or minors.
The coownership form permits the naming of two and only two persons in
the alternative as coowners.
8. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 315.45(a) (Supp. 1945). "During the lives of
both coowners the bond will be paid to either coowner upon his separate
request without requiring the signature of the other coowner; and upon pay-
ment to either coowner the other person shall cease to have any interest in
the bond."
Section 315.46(a) : "The bond will be paid to the registered owner dur-
ing his lifetime upon his properly executed request as though no beneficiary
had been named in the registration."
9. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 315.45(c) (Supp. 1945). "If either coowner
dies without the bond having been presented and surrendered for payment
or authorized reissue, the surviving coowner will be recognized as the sole
and absolute owner of the bond and payment or reissue, as though the
bond were registered in his name alone, will be made only to such survivor."
Section 315.46(c) : "If the registered owner dies without having pre-
sented and surrendered the bond for payment or authorized reissue and is
survived by the beneficiary, upon proof of such death and survivorship, the
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Where a private obligation is made payable to a beneficiary
.upon the death of a primary obligee, a deepseated conflict finds
some courts ruling that the so-called beneficiary acquires an en-
forceable interest 0 and other courts holding that the obligation
becomes part of the estate of the obligee because there is no valid
gift, declaration of trust, or testamentary disposition." Two con-
flicting theories have likewise arisen as to whether the provisions
of the Treasury regulation for payment or reissue of Series E
bonds to a coowner or beneficiary are modified by state law per-
taining to wills and descent and distribution.
One view, represented by Decker v. Fowler,12 is that the dece-
dent's estate is entitled to the proceeds of the savings bond rather
than the named beneficiary upon the theory that the rights of such
beneficiary turned upon the question of whether there had been a
valid execution of a gift inter vivos or causa mortis. The court in
the Decker case justified the application of state transfer law by a
narrow construction of the Treasury regulation, reasoning that the
regulations were designed for the convenience of the government
in making payments and not as a final determination of the rights
of the parties to the proceeds.13 Support for the Decker v. Fowler
interpretation is sought from the apparent analogy to state bank-
ing laws authorizing payment of a joint deposit by banks* to the
survivor, which laws are intended for the protection of the banks
and do not purport to determine the right to the money in the
deposit.' 4 This analogy, however, is only an apparent one. The
beneficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the bond,
and payment or reissue, as though the bond were registered in his name
alone, will be made only to such survivor."
10. Krell v. Codman, (1891) 154 Mass. 454, 28 N. E. 578, 14 L. R. A.
860 and note; Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Rainey, (1944) 353 Mo. 477,
182 S. W. 2d 624, 155 A. L. R. 168 and note.
11. Clark v. Young, (1944) 246 Ala. 529, 21 So. 2d 331; McCarthy v.
Pieret, (1939) 281 N. Y. 407, 24 N. E. 2d 102, rehearing denied, (1940)
282 N. Y. 800, 27 N. E. 2d 207, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 1009.
12. (1939) 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. 2d 254, 131 A. L. R. 961 and note;
accord, Sinift v. Sinift, (1940) 229 Iowa 56, 293 N. W. 841; cf. Deyo v.
Adams, (1942) 178 Misc. 859, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 734, (1944) 182 Misc. 459, 48
N. Y. S. 2d 459, (1943) 27 Minn. L. Rev. 401.
13. This interpretation was necessary to distinguish Warren v. United
States, (1929) 68 Ct. Cl. 634, cert. denied, (1930) 281 U. S. 739, where, in
an action brought to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the proceeds
of certain Treasury savings certificates to the executrix of the decedent's
estate, it was held that payment could be made only to the beneficiaries.
14. See Sinift v. Sinift, (1940) 229 Iowa 56, 88, 293 N. W. 841: "The
purpose of the Secretary and the remedy sought were the same as induced
the enactment of such legislation as Code section 9267 [joint deposits]. It
permits the Treasury department to pay strictly, in accordance with the terms
of the bond, and avoids the inconvenience, delay and burden of ascertaining
the rights of the parties respecting title or ownership as between themselves,
or anyone else."
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purpose of such state banking law provisions is solely to protect
the banks.25 The savings bond regulations, on the other hand,
were not enacted primarily for the government's protection, but
rather must be construed in the light of their purpose as part of a
comprehensive social scheme, i.e., inducement of bond purchases
by the small investor through the privileges of registration.'6 Where
the government has appeared as amicus curiae, it has asserted that
by the import of these words, "sole and absolute owner," the bonds
were enforceable only in accordance with their tenor.'7 To avoid the
undesirable results incurred by invoking the local laws of trans-
fer, three states, Washington,21  New York,1 9 and California, 20
subsequently enacted declaratory legislation making-the provisions
of the Treasury regulations determinative of the rights of the
beneficiary and coowner.
The rule generally adopted by decisions since 1943,21 and made
15. Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Voigt, (1934) 214 Wis. 27, 252 N. W.
355; New Hampshire Say. Bank v. McMullin, (1936) 88 N. H. 123, 185 At.
158.
16. See Note, (1943) 52 Yale L. J. 917, 918. See dissenting opinion,
Decker v. Fowler, (1939) 199 Wash. 549, 558, 92 P. 2d 254, 131 A. L. R.
961 and note, contending that a heretofore attractive form of government
security now ". . . will prove but a snare to those who rely upon it.", and
Matter of Deyo, (1943) 180 Misc. 32, 40, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 379, pointing out that
the attempted construction of the regulations as being only for the protection
of the government accomplished a result never contemplated by the Treasury
Department nor by the millions of bond purchasers.
17. See Harvey v. Rackliffe, (1945) 141 Me. 169, 41 A. 2d 455, 161
A. L. R. 296, 298. Argument of counsel appears only in the American Law
Reports.
18. Wash. Laws 1943, c. 14.
19. Pers. Prop. Law § 24. "Where any United States savings bond is
payable to a designated person, whether as owner, co-owner, or beneficiary,
and such bond is not transferable, the right of such person to receive payment
of such bond according to its terms, and the ownership of the money so
received, shall not be defeated or impaired by any statute or rule of law
governing transfer of property by will or gift or an intestacy, provided,
however, that nothing herein shall limit article ten of the debtor and
creditor law or section one hundred twenty-four of the decedent estate
law."
It will be observed, however, that the New York statute does not admit
the supremacy of the Treasury regulations, and the hedging last clause
thereof may conflict with the restricted creditors' rights of §§ 315.11-315.15,
discussed infra. Under the New York statutes a beneficiary or coowner
who has not given consideration is denied any interest as against a creditor,
trustee in bankruptcy, or receiver of an insolvent estate.
20. Cal. Laws 1943, c. 51.
21. The first case to uphold the right of the coowner or beneficiary
according to the terms of the bond was Meyer v. Mercier, (1938) 102 Colo.
422, 80 P. 2d 332. United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., (M.D. Pa.
1943) 50 F. Supp. 73, the only savings bond case involving ownership to come
before the federal courts, has served as an impetus for subsequent cases,
e.g., Conrad v. Conrad, (1944) 66 Cal. App. 2d 280, 152 P. 2d 221; Edds v.
Mitchell, (1945) 143 Tex. 307, 184 S. W. 2d 823. See McLellan, The Owner-
ship, Taxation and Transfer of United States Savings Bonds, 1946 Annual
Meeting State Bar Association of North Dakota 39, 42.
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statutory in some jurisdictions, 22 is that the beneficiary does acquire
an interest under such bonds and is entitled to them-upon the death
of the owner. Although these decisions rest on both contract and
constitutional grounds, they have a rational basis in the law of
contracts aside from the controlling constitutional grounds. The
rationale is that upon creation of the obligation (issuance of a
bond) there is immediately created in the named parties certain
rights in accordance with the tenor of the bonds and of applicable
regulations, i.e., there is a contract entered into between the United
States Government and the registered owner providing that the
government will recognize the beneficiary's interest upon the oc-
currence of the owner's death.2-3 Inasmuch as there is capacity in
the parties to enter into this type of contract, resort need not be
had to property law to determine the rights of the parties, and
testamentary problems regarding transfers are eliminated. Un-
fortunately, the reasoning frequently seized upon to support the
contract theory 24 -that the beneficiary of a bond acquires a vested
interest from the moment of issuance (with merely the right to
enjoyment postponed until the death of the owner) because the
owner cannot cut off the beneficiary's interest without his consent
if the owner desires to retain rather than cash the bond2 5 -con-
fuses property law with contract law. Resort to such reasoning
is unnecessary. Under the principles of contract law, if the owner
were entitled to a reissue upon his separate request to eliminate
the named coowner or beneficiary, the beneficiary should still be
entitled to the bonds on the death of the owner in the event there
has been no such reissue. Indeed the writer suggests that the
regulations be amended to allow such reissue, for under the present
law26 redemption before maturity results in a loss of increment
in value due to the accelerating rate of yield. In any event the
denomination of the interest of an owner or coowner in possession
simply as a primary interest and that of a beneficiary or coowner
not in possession as a secondary interest would be an aid to clarity
in the avoidance of confusing property terms. Commentators27 find
22. See supra notes 18, 19, and 20.
23. See 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) 1139; (1943) 27 Minn.
L. Rev. 401.
24. See Matter of Staheli, (1945) 57 N. Y. S. 2d 185, aff'd, (1946)
66 N. Y. S. 2d 271; Matter of Deyo, (1943) 180 Misc. 32, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 379.
25. See 31 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 315.45(b), 315.46(b) (Supp. 1945).
26. See table of redemption values and investment yields, 31 Code
Fed. Regs. § 316.11 (Supp. 1943).
27. Gammon, War Savings Bonds and State Succession Laws, (1943)
17 Tenn. L. Rev. 928, 931; Note, (1943) 4 Mont. L. Rev. 70, 74; (1943)
56 Harv. L. Rev. 1007.
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the situation of such a beneficiary analogous to that of the named
beneficiary of a life insurance policy wherein the insured reserves
the privilege of changing the beneficiary. However, the decisive
factors (recognized in the more recent savings bond decisions)
which compel the acceptance of the contract theory, i.e., that the
borrowing power of the federal government necessarily includes
the power to fix the terms of its obligations 28 and that the federal
law overrides any state law to the contrary,20 are not applicable
to forms of private obligations.
The courts are agreed that the Treasury regulations governing
issuance and redemption of savings bonds are within the scope
of granted authority and have the effect of federal law.30 No state
law can vary the terms of federal obligations nor detract from their
full enforceability.3 If, however, the interpretation of savings bond
contracts were to be controlled by state decisions applying general
law, Warren v. United States3 2 would lose its force for it might
be distinguished, restricted, or nullified in forty-eight different
manners.
33
Where Congress has left interstices to be filled by judicial
determination, the extent and nature of the legal consequences of a
federal statute must be derived from the federal policy behind
such statute; conflicting local law and policy must yield.34 Similar
considerations prevail where, as here, gaps remain in regulations
enacted pursuant to an enabling statute. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins-5 is
to be distinguished. The motivation for the Erie decision lay in the
desire and need for uniformity within each of the forty-eight
jurisdictions concerning matters in which local law and policy were
the primary considerations. But it is nationwide, not merely state-
wide, uniformity which is not only desirable but also imperative
to the success of the Series E bond program. In other fields the
28. United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., (M.D. Pa. 1943) 50
F. Supp. 73; Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, (1943) 133 N. J.
Eq. 11, 29 A. 2d 854; Davies v. Beach, (Cal. App. 1946) 168 P. 2d 452;
Meyer v. Mercier, (1938) 102 Colo. 422, 80 P. 2d 332.
29. See note 28 supra.
30. In re Estate of Murray, (1945) 236 Iowa 807, 20 N. W. 2d 49;
Succession of Tanner, (La. App. 1946) 24 So. 2d 642; Franklin Washington
Trust Co. v. Beltram, (1943) 133 N. J. Eq. 11, 29 A. 2d 854.
31. See McCulloch v. Maryland, (U.S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 316,' 436;
United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., (M.D. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp.
73, 77.
32. (1929) 68 Ct. Cl. 634, cert. denied, (1930) 281 U. S. 739. See
supra note 13.
33. See supra note 13 and text.
34. See Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., (1942) 317 U. S. 173, 176;
Deitrick v. Greaney, (1940) 309 U. S. 190, 200-201.
35. (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 114 A. L. R. 1487 and note.
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Supreme Court has already developed a doctrine limiting the scope
of the Erie case by applying "federal common law" to fill these
areas where the sweep of the statute compels its implementation
in all its aspects by a broad federal policy, whether action is brought
in a state or a federal court. 38 That savings bonds in all their con-
sequences involve purely federal questions has been recognized
in United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.,37 the only savings
bond case dealing with the problem of ownership yet to come
before the federal courts.
ii. TRANSFERABILITY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS
The two paramount objectives of the Treasury's uninterrupted
drive to sell Series E bonds are, as has been stated above,38 (1) re-
striction of inflation within reasonable bounds and (2) promotion
of a widespread ownership of the public debt with the incidental
positive result that all manner of people will realize they are part
of their national government and will consequently constitute a
more fully-participating, alert citizenry. Series E bonds are attractive
because of the high rate of yield, 9 not elsewhere obtainable without
the addition of a risk factor, and because of the simplicity of regis-
tration; they will lose none of this attractiveness if the uniformity
of decision sought by the Treasury is secured, as discussed in the
preceding section. But the Treasury's objectives cannot be ade-
quately served if the money value represented by the bonds can,
without redemption, be made readily available to the credit struc-
ture of the nation.40 Restrictions have therefore been placed on
36. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F. D. I. C., (1942) 315 U. S. 447,
26 Minn. L. Rev. 899; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., (1942) 317 U. S.
289; Note, (1946) 59 Harv. L. Rev. 966. Although ownership cases decided
since 1943 are generally in accord with the broad federal policy behind the
savings bond regulations, numerous cases involving transferability are seem-
ingly in conflict with the policy. See infra Section II. TRANSFERABILITY
AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS.
37. See (M.D. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 73, 77: "Application to the issue
and sale of these securities of state law would lead to a great diversity of
rules regulating title and redemption and would subject the entire financing
plan of the Federal Government to exceptional uncertainty by making identi-
cal transactions subject to the vagaries of the several states. This con-
stitutes another example in'the constantly increasing list of cases where
application of the doctrine of Erie R. v. Tompkins, supra, will lead to more
confusion in the Federal law."
38. See supra note 2 and text.
39. The investment yield on Series E bonds, if held to maturity, is
about 2.9% per annum, compounded semi-annually. 31 Code Fed. Regs.,
§ 316.2(b) (Supp. 1943). Comparable rates on Series F and G, the govern-
ment bonds having the next most attractive yield, are respectively 2.53%
and 2.5%. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 3182(c) (d) (Supp. 1944).
40. See Moore's Adm'r v. Marshall, (1946) 302 Ky. 729, 196 S. W.
2d 369, 372; Matter of Owens, (1941) 177 Misc. 1006, 1008, 32 N. Y. S.
2d 747.
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transferability of and creditors' rights in savings bonds. 31 Code
Fed. Regs. § 315.11 (Supp. 1945) provides:
"Savings bonds are not transferable and are payable only to the
owners named thereon, except in case of the disability or death of
the owner, authorized reissue, or as otherwise specifically provided.
. . . A savings bonds may not be hypothecated or pledged as col-
lateral for a loan or used as security for the performance of an
obligation, except as provided in Section 315.12."
The exception provided for in 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 315.12 (Supp.
1945) permits only a negligible transferability not calculated to
affect adversely the avowed purpose of the savings bond program
in that such bonds may be pledged only with the Secretary of the
Treasury. Here again, unfortunately, numerous courts are reducing
the effectiveness of the program by finding in Section 315.11 a
transferability clearly not contemplated. In Marshall v. Felker1 it
was held that Series E bonds may, notwithstanding the fact that
they are marked "not transferable," be the subject of a valid gift
inter vivos so long as the federal statutes, rules, and regulations
under which they are issued contain no express prohibition against
a transfer by gift. A gift causa mortis was sustained in Matter of
Borchardt,- with the explanation that there was nothing contained
in the regulations which expressed or implied a prohibition against
gifts causa mortis of savings bonds and that the common law was
therefore controlling.4 3 The only exception, other than that in
Section 315.12, by which Series E bonds in the hands of the public
may be made transferable is provided for in 31 Code Fed. Regs.
§ 315.13 (Supp. 1945):
"Judicial Proceedings (Judgment Creditors, Trustees in
Bankruptcy, Receivers of Insolvents' Estates and Conflicting
Claimants) .- A claim against an owner or coowner of a savings
bond and conflicting claims as to ownership of or interest in such
bond as between coowners or the registered owner and a designated
beneficiary, will be recognized when established by valid judicial
41. (1945) 156 Fla. 476, 23 So. 2d 555, 161 A. L. R. 167 and note. To
the same effect, Hausfelder v. Security-First Nat. Bank, (Cal. App. 1946)
176 P. 2d 84.
42. (1942) 179 Misc. 456, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 987. To the same effect,
Dietzen v. Am. Trust & Bkg. Co., (1939) 175 Tenn. 49, 131 S. W. 2d 69.
In upholding a gift causa mortis of postal savings certificates an Illinois
court has taken the extreme position that the legal meaning of "not trans-
ferable" was the same as that of "not negotiable." Blair v. Kirchner, (1943)
319 Ill. App. 348.
43. The persuasiveness of such holdings as this is illustrated by Marshall
v. Felker, (1945) 156 Fla. 476, 478, 23 So. 2d 555, 161 A. L. R. 167 and
note, wherein the executor conceded a transferability causa mortis, merely
resisting the gift as inter vivos.
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proceedings and payment or reissue will be made, upon presenta-
tion and surrender of the bond, except as follows:
(a) No such proceedings will be recognized if they would give
effect to an attempted voluntary transfer inter vivos of the bond
or would defeat or impair the rights of survivorship conferred by
these regulations upon a surviving coowner or beneficiary.
(b) A judgment creditor, a trustee in bankruptcy or a receiver
of an insolvent's estate will have the right to payment (but not to
reissue)....
(c) If a debtor, or bankrupt, or insolvent, is not the sole owner
of the bond, payment will be made only to the extent of his interest
therein, which must be determined by the court or otherwise
validly established. . ....
Section 315.13 (a) clearly contains a prohibition of gifts inter vivos
in that it permits only involuntary transfers inter vivos in favor of
creditors. 4 4 The black-letter heading would seem to restrict the
judicial proceedings provided for to creditors or their representa-
tives and to conflicting claimants. A "conflicting claimant" is
limited to a named registeree in the bond. In any event, the Florida
court in Marshall v. Felker makes clear that only an empty right
is created by decisions allowing transfers by gift by pointing out
that it is only the right of the donee against the donor's estate that is
being passed upon and that the donee may yet experience frustration
in the attempt to procure the proceeds of the bonds from the govern-
ment when they are presented for payment.4 5
In Cook v. Marks,46 where the coowner and the defendants
schemed to evade the prohibition of Section 315.11 and made the
bonds security for a loan to the coowner, the court held the trans-
action void as against public policy but applied the clean hands
doctrine and dismissed the owner's suit for return of the bonds.
The practical result of this decision was to leave possession of the
bonds in the hands of the creditor. This is in clear contravention of
the regulations and serves to create confusion, for such possession
gives the creditor no right to cash the bonds.
The public policy served by the retention of Series E bonds
by the original registered owners is recognized by the recent case of
44. Id. at 479, simply states, however, that this provision is not to be
construed as making unlawful such transfer, as between a donor and donee.
45. 'Ibid. Thus, the resultant futility and confusion of these holdings
is the same as that involved in Decker v. Fowler, (1939) 199 Wash. 549,
92 P. 2d 254, 131 A. L. R. 961 and note, purporting to deprive registered
coowners and beneficiaries of any ownership interest.
46. (1942) 302 Mich. 55, 4 N. W. 2d 465, 140 A. L. R. 1429 and note.
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Moore's Adm'r v. Marshall'7 in which the court set aside a gift
inter vivos. The court pointed out that a contrary holding "...
would open the door for evasion of plainly expressed restrictions
on transfer." 48 A similar recognition of the purpose of savings
bonds prompted a New York court in Matter of Owens 49 to rule
out an attempted inter vivos gift of savings bonds and to indicate
that a gift causa mortis would also be prohibited. The first decision
to hold squarely against gifts causa mortis of Series E bonds is the
recent case of Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk.50 The character
of Series E bonds as thrift securities, negating any suggestion of
voluntary transferability, is further made out by provisions for an
accelerating annual yield"' and for payment of such increment in
value only upon redemption.5 2
The intent of the Treasury Department to impose restrictions on
creditors' rights is apparent, but the extent of the limitation, as ex-
pressed in the regulations, 5 3 is spelled out'with something less than
clarity.
No difficulties are encountered insofar as Series E bonds regis-
tered in only one name are concerned. Personal property in general
is subject to attachment and supplementary proceedings,54 and in
the absence of a provision exempting savings bonds registered in
one name, such bonds are similarly subject to these proceedings.
47. (1946) 302 Ky. 729, 196 S. W. 2d 369, 372. To the same effect,
Bunch v. Hulsey, (1946) 302 Ky. 763, 196 S. W. 2d 373, 375. In neither case
was the Kentucky court called upon to decide the invalidity*of a gift causa
mortis, but the expression of purpose in the first case makes clear that such
gift would also fail.
48. Moore's Adm'r v. Marshall, (1946) 302 Ky. 729, 196 S. W. 2d 369,.
372. The court also recognized that the reference to gift taxes in the regu-
lations, now Treas. Dept. Cir. No. 653, 2d Revision (1943), 11(4), 31-Code
Fed. Regs. § 316.2(d) (Supp. 1943), was merely a provision for the situa-
tion where the purchaser of a bond has it registered in the name of another
person rather than an implication of transferability.
49. (1941) 177 Misc. 1006, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 747; accord, In re Tonkin's
Estate, (1946) 65 N. Y. S. 2d 484. Similar considerations compelled the
surrogate court to rule that veterans' adjusted service bonds could not be
the subject of a valid gift causa mortis. Matter of Ballard, (1937) 161
Misc. 785, 293 N. Y. Supp. 31.
50. (N.J., Ct. Err. & App. 1947) 55 A. 2d 26. The court emphasized
that the purport of the regulations indicates a clear intention that Series E
bonds shall not be transferable except by the prescribed processes of registra-
tion and concluded that ". . . it cannot reasonably be assumed that these
conditions ... were intended to be subject to rules pertaining to the devolu-
tion of personal property in the various states, or to varying interpretations
which might be accorded by the different state courts." See text to notes 34-37
supra.
51. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 316.11 (Supp. 1943).
52. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 315.20 (Supp. 1945).
53. 31 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 315.11-315.15 (Supp. 1945).
54. Glenn, Liquidation (1935) 465; Glenn, The Rights and Remedies
of Creditors (1915) 22-23.
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The United States, however, may not be made a party to such pro-
ceedings, nor will attachment or garnishment process or similar
types of enforcement proceedings lie against it.'5 Before a creditor
may obtain payment of the bonds, he must have established his
claim by a judgment.5 6 The government affords the creditor no
assistance in supplementary proceedings in that the regulations
nowhere provide a method by which the creditor may ascertain if
any bonds have been issued to the debtor and, if so, whether or not
they have been redeemed. A judgment creditor has the right to pay-
ment but not to reissue." The owner may have reissue in authorized
denominations in the amount of the excess after the judgment is
paid," and such remainder will bear the original issue date."'
The determination of the exemption status of coowner and
owner-beneficiary type bonds is a more difficult matter. If an ex-
emption is conferred at all, it is conferred by Section 315.13 of the
regulations, quoted supra, and the draftsmanship of this section
leaves one in doubt. Section 315.13 (a) provides that no judicial
proceedings will be recognized if they would defeat or impair the
rights of survivorship conferred by the regulations. Section 315.13
(c) states that the creditor is entitled to payment to the extent of
the interest of the debtor, bankrupt, or insolvent.
The first uncertainty which arises is whether Subsections 315.13
(a) and 315.13 (c) were intended to qualify each other. It may
be that the Jast clause of Section 315.13 (a) represents a pre-
caution against possible judicial sanction of sub rosa transactions
evading restrictions on transferability. But if the two subsections
do operate on each other, then it is necessary to determine precisely
what rights of survivorship are conferred by the regulations as
against creditors. Section 315.46 (c) provides that payment will
be made to a surviving beneficiary "If the registered owner dies
without having presented and surrendered the bond" for payment
or reissue.
Section 315.45 (c) provides that payment will be made to a
surviving coowner "If [the other] coowner dies without the bond
having been presented and surrendered" for payment or reissue. Is
any significance to be attributed to the difference in wording, be
it intentional or not? The immediately preceding revision of the
55. Buchanan v. Alexander, (U.S. 1846) 4 How. 20; Brooks Hard-
ware Co. v. Greer, (1911) 111 Me. 78, 87 Ati. 889.
56. 31 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 315.14, 315.15 (Supp. 1945).
57. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 315.13(b) (Supp. 1945).
58. This is deducible from 31 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 315.13 and 315.30
(Supp. 1945).
59. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 315.36 (Supp. 1945).
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regulations used the words, "without having presented and sur-
rendered the bond," in both instances.6 Because the language of the
present revision would seem to require that the owner himself
have presented and surrendered the bond for payment in order to
defeat the rights of survivorship of the beneficiary, greater rights
of survivorship seem to have been created in a beneficiary than in a
coowner unless the reference to presentation and surrender can be
said to include involuntary action in both cases. The sections on
presentation and surrender 6' do not seem to provide any clue. In
view of this uncertainty, it cannot be said that the regulations
definitely determine the extent of the exemption, if any, which
has been conferred on these types of bonds.
The creditor has thus far prevailed over the coowner or bene-
ficiary in all cases in which the owner-debtor was involved in bank-
ruptcy or supplementary proceedings, but although the issue has
been raised in most instances, the courts have shied away from a
discussion of Section 315.13. Saper v. Sussnzan62 held a bond in
the possession of the beneficiary under a purported gift to be
subject to replevy by the owner's trustee in bankruptcy, the court
writing only a memorandum opinion. In In re Wyche6'3 and Morris
Plan Industrial Bank v. Finn,6 4 both of which were cases involving
the discharge of a bankrupt, the federal courts have assumed
without deciding that such bonds, at least those in the
possession of the bankrupt owner, were assets of the bankrupt
estate. In the Wyche case the court stated that the bankrupt
could not, for the purpose of denying discharge, be charged with
bad faith in concluding that the bonds were exempt inasmuch as
neither court nor counsel were able to cite authority for seizing and
selling them."' The Finn case, however, suggests that a coowner
in possession who has not contributed to the purchase price may
have a right which cannot be defeated by the owner's creditor. 66
The most recent case, In re Bartlett,7 offers little assistance, for
the New York federal district court therein apparently relies on
60. See 31 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 315.36, 315.32(b) (Cum. Supp.) ; see also
31 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 315.32(c) (1944 Supp.).
61. 31- Code Fed. Regs. §§ 315.24, 315.28 (Supp. 1945).
62. (1945) 185 Misc. 277, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 377.
63. (W.D. La. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 825.
64. (C.C.A. 2d 1945) 149 F. 2d 591.
65. In re Wyche, (W.D. La. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 825, 828.
66. Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Finn, (C.C.A. 2d 1945) 149 F. 2a
591,592: "[The referee] also found that the wife 'could have refused to
convert the bonds into cash or allow the bankrupt control or custody of them,'
which was perhaps literally true ;".
67. (N.D. N.Y. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 514.
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the memorandum decision of Saper v. Sussman s and concludes
that the bonds were assets which could be reached by the trustee
in bankruptcy because the beneficiary had no enforceable interest
until the contingency of the purchaser's death bad occurred. The
court sought support for its conclusion by reference, not to Section
315.13, but rather to Section 315.11, supra, and Section 315.46 (a)1 9
which provides that payment would be made only to the registered
owner during his lifetime as if no beneficiary had been named.
Only one decision, Iowa Methodist Hospital v. Long,7 0 has been
found involving a supplementary proceeding in favor of a creditor.
The Iowa court seems to decide that the bonds were wholly sub-
ject to the judgment creditor's claim on the basis of the intent of
the named registrees.7 ' In that case the owner-purchaser by his
own testimony in court asserted full ownership in himself, thereby
denying an intention to create a right in the coowner; the coowner
neither testified contrarily nor asserted a claim of ownership. It
would seem, however, that the introduction of the subjective ele-
ment to determine rights in the bonds is neither desirable nor
permissible. The inquiry should rather have been directed to
whether the rights of the coowner as against the creditor were de-
pendent on the fact of consideration contributed by her, or on
the fact of registration as coowner considered apart from her
contribution of purchase money.
The mostcompelling argument for upholding these decisions in
favor of the creditor is the very uncertainty of the meaning of Sec-
tion 315.13. Inasmuch as some fifty billion dollars worth of securi-
ties is involved and because of the absence of clear and uncontradic-
tory language, one can easily understand the hesitation of the
courts to rule that an exemption has been granted.
Other cases involving creditors have properly held that the
interest of the surviving beneficiary of a bond could not be sub-
ordinated to the rights of creditors of a deceased owner-purchaser's
estate.7 2
68. (1945) 185 Misc. 277, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 377. It may be noted that the
Sussman case was decided under the New York statute on savings bonds,
supra note 19, which may be invalid to the extent that it seeks to preserve
creditors' rights which would be applicable in the absence of the savings
bond regulations.
69. See supra note 8.
70. (1944) 234 Iowa 843, 12 N. W. 2d 171, 150 A. L. R. 440 and note.
71. Id. at 849-850.
72. In re Briley Estate, (1945) 155 Fla. 798, 21 So. 2d 595; Matter of
Hager, (1943) 181 Misc. 431, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 468. In the latter case the bonds
were recovered from the administratrix who had possession, claiming they
had been delivered to her in her personal capacity in payment of a debt
due her from the decedent.
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The foregoing discussion makes this much certain-a revision
of the regulations directed at a clarification of Section 315.13 and
of the sections which purport to set out the extent of the rights of
survivorship is, at the very least, desirable.73
III. TAXATION
Interest on government obligations issued on or after March 1,
1941, was made taxable by Section 4 of the Public Debt Act of
1941. 7' The increment in value represented by the difference be-
tween the purchase price of Series E bonds and their redemption
value is considered as interest for tax purposes, and this interest
is subject to such income and profits taxes as may be imposed by
the United States. The bonds are also subject to federal and state
estate, inheritance, gift, and other excise taxes, but are specifically
exempted from all other taxation.7 5
An informational bulletin issued by the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue 7 advises that no federal gift tax is imposed if, e.g.,
A purchases savings bonds with his own funds and has them regis-
tered in the names of "A oi- B" and keeps them in his possession,
or in "A, payable on death to B," for A may at any time redeem
the bonds and retain the proceeds for his own benefit. But there is
a taxable gift at the time of purchase if registration is in the name
"B" or "B, payable on death to A," for it is now B who may re-
deem the bonds. If A purchases and registers bonds in the names
of "A or B," there is no gift for federal gift tax purposes unless
and until B redeems the bonds after A has relinquished possession
to him. While the failure to levy a gift tax at the time possession
passes between coowners is logically inconsistent in view of the
73. The problem of retroactive operation of the changed regulations
would not arise if such a change were construed as enlarging the scope of
the exemption (thereby reducing the rights of creditors), for no provision
of the constitution prohibits Congress from impairing the obligation of
contracts. See Mitchell v. Clark, (1884) 110 U. S. 633, 643; Louisville Bank
v. Radford, (1935) 295 U. S. 555, 589. Nor would it involve the deprivation
of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment, for section 315.11 precludes the acquisition by the creditor of sub-
stantive rights in specific bonds in the absence of a judgment having been
obtained under section 315.13. Cf. Louisville Bank v. Radford, supra. If the
change were construed as restricting the scope of the exemption, problems
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment might arise.
74. 55 Stat. 7, § 4 (1941) as amended, 56 Stat. 189, § 6 (1942), 31
U. S. C. § 742a (Supp. 1946); see 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 29.22(b) (4)-4
(Supp. 1945).
75. 31 Code Fed. Regs. § 316.2(d) (Supp. 1943); see 26 Code Fed.
Regs. § 81.13 (Cum. Supp.).
76. Bur. of Int. Rev., Mimeographed letter 5202 (instructions to Bureau
field offices), Cum. Bul. 1941-2, 241. Cf. Inheritance Tax Div. v. Chamberlin
Est., (1944) 21 Wash. 2d 790, 153 P. 2d 305.
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rights of a coowner in possession, the Commissioner's approach to
the problem is sound as a matter of practical tax administration.
The extent to which the transfer of Series E bonds is subject to
state taxes depends upon applicable state law.
No new problem concerning income and estate taxes arises
when the bond is registered in one name only. The coowner and
beneficiary type bonds, however, do raise problems. Where the
bonds are taken out in the names of "A or B" interest is taxed as
income of the person who contributed the purchase price; where
both A and B have contributed to the purchase price, interest is
divided proportionately. 77
Treasury regulations recognize surviving beneficiaries and co-
owners as sole and absolute owners of savings bonds,78 and the
bonds are free from probate proceedings on a deceased owner's
estate.7 1 It does not follow, however, that the present redemption
value of the bonds is exempt from estate and inheritance taxes, for
the status of the bonds for probate proceedings and their status
for tax purposes are separate considerations having no relation to
one another.80 The order in which the names are registered on co-
owner type bonds is of no import. The first person named is called
the owner and the second the coowner for administrative purposes
which affect neither the legal rights of coowners nor tax questions.,
The sale of Series E bonds is primarily directed at people of
average means. For these people taxation does not enter into the
picture except as to income from interest. Present federal law pro-
vides a specific gift tax exemption of $30,000"2 and an exemption
for the additional estate tax of $60,000.83 State exemptions will, in
77. Bur. of Int. Rev., Income Tax Office Dec. 3301, Cum. Bul. 1939-2,75.
78. 31 Code Fed. Regs. §§ 315.45(c), 315.46(c) (Supp. 1945).
79. Release, Bur. of the Public Debt, June 14, 1944, Taxable Status
of United States Savings Bonds for the Purposes of the Federal Estate
Tax and State Estate, Inheritance and Legacy Taxes.
80. See 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 81.17 (Supp. 1945) ; 26 Code Fed. Regs.§ 81.22 (Supp. 1945) ; In re Prifer Estate, (Pa. Orph. 1945) 7 Monroe L. R.
19, 10 Sch. Reg. 170. But cf. Succession of Tanner, (La. App. 1946) 24 So.
2d 642, which held that bonds registered in the names of husband and wife
as coowners and purchased with community funds were not subject to the
state inheritance t x upon husband's death, failing to distinguish ownership
and tax status. The Louisiana court employed an analogy to the proceeds
of insurance policies, which by a well-settled rule in that state are not subject
to estate taxes.
81. Release, Bur. of the Public Debt, June 14, 1944, Taxable Status
of United States Savings Bonds for the Purposes of the Federal Estate Tax
and State Estate, Inheritance and Legacy Taxes.
82. Int. Rev. Code § 1004(a) (1); see 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 86.12(Cum. Supp.).
83. In. Rev. Code § 935(c) ; see 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 81.48 (Cure.
Supp.).
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the bulk of the cases, similarly exceed the amount of gifts and
estates of persons of average means.84 It is only where large
amounts are involved that gift and estate and inheritance taxes are
paid. In this situation registration in the owner-beneficiary rather
than the coowner form may be more desirable because of the
difference in the burden of proof where the owner is predeceased
by the other party having an interest. The law provides that the
entire amount of the coowner type bond is prima facie part of a
decedent's gross estate ;85 thus, if the owner survives, the taxpayer
has the burden of proving consideration contributed by the owner.
It would seem that no such burden rests with the taxpayer where
the beneficiary predeceases the owner of an owner-beneficiary type
bond inasmuch as the tax regulations do not affirmatively provide
for this situation. The fact that a gift tax has been paid does not
eliminate liability for estate and inheritance taxes, merely being
allowable as a credit against those taxes.86
CONCLUSIONS
Although the problem of ownership has not been authoritatively
settled, ownership disputes have been resolved in accord with the
purposes of the savings bond program of the Treasury Department
since 1943. Taxation of savings bonds poses no particular difficul-
ties. Effectuation of the fiscal and social policy behind the sale to
the public of savings bonds continues to be hindered, however, by
transferability and creditors' rights problems. The foregoing sur-
vey leads to the conclusion that these final barriers can be re-
moved by (1) uniform decisions restricting transferability in
accord with the plain meaning and purpose of Section 315.11 and
(2) a revision of the regulations directed toward a clarification of
Section 315.13.
84. E.g., Minnesota allows gift and inheritance tax exemptions of$10,000 each if the donee is a wife or minor child, $5,000 each if the donee
is a husband or adult child, etc. 1 Minn. Stat. 1945, §§ 292.05, 291.05.
85. 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 81.22 (Supp. 1945).
86. Int. Rev. Code § 813(a) ; 26 Code Fed. Regs. § 81.8 (Cum. Supp.).
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